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Abstract 
 
This paper takes a closer look at the Bosnia and Kosovo peace talks and attempts to 
analyse why the former was a success and the letter a failure in terms of ending the 
war. This is done through the prism of the three main theoretical approaches in IR - 
realism, liberalism, and constructivism - as well as the negotiation theory. The 
paper argues that in its essence the Yugoslav crisis was very realistic - an ethnic 
security dilemma caused by an emerging internal anarchy in Yugoslavia. The 
resulting conflicts presented liberal Western states with a difficult riddle of finding 
the right balance between support to self-determination and sovereignty. The paper 
shows that in trying to solve this riddle they chose the middle way of alternating 
between realist and liberal policies, leaving behind imperfect solutions.  
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1.- Introduction. 
 
In the Balkans, the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War were followed 
by a very violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Hundreds of thousands of 
people were killed in the conflicts that broke out one after another, many more were 
made refugees, and the economy of what was once a relatively prosperous country 
laid in ruins. TV pictures of brutal killings and human suffering at the end of the 
twentieth century made the wars in the former Yugoslavia a major and urgent 
international issue. However, the international community was for a long time 
unable to find a solution to the crisis that was unfolding at a critical time in 
international relations.  
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 Bosnia and Herzegovina was the bloodiest and longest of Yugoslav 
conflicts. It would take four years of mostly fruitless political effort by the EU and 
thousands of deaths for the warring parties to sit together and engage in meaningful 
peace talks1. Three interrelated elements played a key part in making the Bosnian 
Serbs, Muslims, and Croats finally accept the need for a negotiated solution: a 
decision by the Clinton administration in the US to get seriously involved in the 
search for a solution to the problem that could no longer be ignored, NATO's air 
campaign against Bosnian Serb military positions, and a joint offensive against the 
Serbs by the recently armed Muslims and Croats, which helped significantly change 
the balance of power and territorial gains2. The peace talks held at the US air force 
base in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995 took three weeks and resulted in an 
agreement that ended the war in Bosnia and preserved the country within its 
previously recognized international borders.  
 Three years later, the former Yugoslavia would again dominate the 
international agenda. This time it was Kosovo, at the time a Serbian province with a 
majority ethnic Albanian population. Stripped of its autonomy by the Serbian 
regime of President Slobodan Milosevic and under police repression, Kosovo had 
been a disaster waiting to happen. With Kosovo Albanians totally excluded from all 
aspects of public life in the province, and with their strategy of peaceful resistance 
through parallel institutions, Kosovo had for a long time looked as it had been a 
problem brushed under the carpet3. This situation began to change in 1997-8 when 
an until-then unknown Kosovo Albanian guerrilla force intensified its attacks 
against Serbian police forces in the province. When the fighting and the 
humanitarian crisis caused by it intensified, the Serbs and Albanians were 
summoned to peace talks in France. 
 The talks at the French chateau in Rambouillet were quite different from 
the ones in Dayton. They were preceded by a threat of force rather than use of it, as 
was the case with Dayton; the venue - a castle outside Paris - was, in all its 
splendour, a total opposite of the grim and basic US Air Force base in Ohio; the 
talks between the Albanian and Serbian delegations were exclusively of the 
proximity type, with the two delegations never meeting directly, and they were 
mediated by the representatives of the Contact Group (made up of France, 
                                                
1 Hereafter, Bosnia-Herzegovina will be referred to as Bosnia. 
2 Bosnian Muslims have, especially after the conflict, been referred to in the media and academic 
literature as Bosniaks. Another term, also frequently in use, is Bosnians, but it is misleading as it was 
originally used to refer to the people of Bosnia, regardless of their ethnic origin or religion.  
3 I find the alternative terms for Kosovo Albanians, used in the media and the literature, such as 
Kosovars and Kosovans, somewhat misleading as they can be interpreted to refer to all citizens of 
Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic origin.  
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Germany, the UK, Italy, Russia and the US). The talks ended without an agreement 
and were followed by NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 This paper will take a closer look at the peace talks in Dayton and 
Rambouillet and an attempt to answer why the former was a success and the latter a 
failure. The paper will argue that in Dayton there was genuine willingness by at 
least one of the parties to end the conflict, after the situation on the ground had been 
significantly changed. It will also argue that there was no such willingness at 
Rambouillet, where the talks were held under a threat of an outside intervention in 
favour of one of the sides, and where mutual distrust between the parties was much 
deeper.  
 
2.- Origins of the crisis. 
 
After the death of President Tito in 1980 it quickly became clear that the leaders of 
Yugoslavia's six republics and two autonomous provinces were unable to agree on 
how to reform the country beset by deep economic problems4. They increasingly 
resorted to nationalism, portraying their own nation as victim and accusing others 
of exploiting it. Posen (1993:27) characterizes the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia at that time as being one of ‘emerging anarchy’ - in which the absence 
of an effective central government meant that the country’s various ethnic groups 
were compelled to provide for their own security. When the western republics of 
Slovenia and Croatia decided to leave the Yugoslav federation, the central republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its ethnically mixed population of Muslims, 
Croats and Serbs, was left with an extremely difficult choice: to go for 
independence and risk serious internal conflict, which by then the Bosnian Serbs 
had been threatening, or to stay in a rump Yugoslavia, dominated by Milosevic’s 
Serbia.       
 The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union brought 
about unipolarity, which caused the United States, as the only remaining 
superpower, to redefine its security strategy in terms of the spread of US political 
and economic values. This inadvertently reduced the security and power of the 
Yugoslav government relative to its constituent republics, and created an internal 
anarchy and emerging security dilemma among various ethnic groups that lived in 
Yugoslavia (Adams, 2006:18). The Yugoslav case demonstrates that international 
anarchy is not only the permissive cause of international war; it is also the 
permissive cause of civil war because it helps create an internal anarchy in which 
                                                
4  Under the 1974 Constitution, the provinces were formally part of Serbia, but with separate 
representation and voting rights in the Yugoslavia's collective Presidency 
Aleksandar Kocić 
 
 
182  
 
domestic politics come to resemble international ones. As Yugoslavs watched their 
state weaken, they took steps to provide for their own security, and in doing so, 
each group increased the insecurity of the others. The various ethnic groups were 
thus both power and security maximisers: power maximisers in their relations with 
the federal government, and security maximisers in relations with one another. 
Finally, in the absence of a strong federal government, another great power, or a 
strong international institution to mediate their differences, the Yugoslavs resorted 
to war. 
 In looking at the causes of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and wars, one must 
not ignore the issues of identity and victimhood that fuelled the conflict. In 
Yugoslavia the idea of a united nation of Southern Slavs competed with, and 
eventually lost to, the idea of particularistic nationalisms. By using Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s (1998) theory of a norm life-cycle, we can understand the emergence of 
and competition between ideas of collective identity like Yugoslavianism and 
particularistic nationalities5. The Yugoslav idea, in its most recent form, was 
introduced partly through coercion by Tito after World War II (Hoffmann, 
2006:126). A look at the history of the post-WWII Yugoslavia would show that the 
Yugoslav idea was not fully internalized by the people who resided within the 
borders of the country. Beginning in the 1960s, there was an emergence of 
"entrepreneurs" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) who used nationalist ideas to 
pursue a variety of agendas. Nationalism fit with a general population suffering 
through economic crisis while nationalists reminded that population of recent past 
atrocities (Hoffmann, 2006:134). Unlike the Yugoslav one, the particular nationalist 
ideas, combined with the changing international circumstances, did reach critical 
mass and thus removed the underlying foundation for the state of Yugoslavia.   
 
3.- Dayton peace talks. 
 
At the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, hardly any Western governments wanted to 
see Yugoslavia break up into its constituent republics, let alone into new states 
based solely on the criteria of blood and the winner takes all (Judah, 1997:200). 
After the US Secretary of State James Baker’s unsuccessful trip to Belgrade on the 
eve of the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991 - 
when he famously said: "We don't have a dog in this fight" (quoted in Silber and 
Little, 1996:201) - the US decided to take a back seat and leave the problem to the 
                                                
5 The norm life cycle, which explains the emergence of norms, is composed of three linked stages: 
emergence, cascade, and internalization. 
FROM DIPLOMACY BACKED BY FORCE TO FORCE BACKED DIPLOMACY - A 
COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE BOSNIA AND KOSOVO TALKS 
 
 
  183 
 
Europeans to deal with6. Lord Carrington, the former British foreign secretary, was 
asked by the then European Community to chair a peace conference in The Hague. 
He proposed recognition for the Yugoslav republics that requested it after all 
outstanding issues had been resolved. In the face of German pressure, this point was 
ignored and the EC recognized Croatia and Slovenia on  January 15 1992. Bosnia 
was asked to have a referendum if it wanted recognition. At the same time, 
however, Lord Carrington warned that "early recognition" would mean that none of 
the parties would be "much interested" in continuing to talk (Judah 1997:200). His 
advice was ignored and after a referendum on independence in February 1992 
(which the Bosnian Serbs boycotted), Bosnia was promptly recognized as an 
independent country. The war broke out less than two months later.  
 After several failed attempts at ending the war (1993 Vance-Owen peace 
plan7, and 1994 Contact Group plan), things began to change in 1995, when the US 
decided to take the leading role. This decision was motivated partly by the changing 
situation on the ground, with the Bosnian Serbs making a final push to end the war 
on their terms and increasingly committing horrifying atrocities, and partly by a US 
Congress bill to unilaterally lift the UN imposed arms embargo on former 
Yugoslavia, which left the Bosnian Muslims at a military disadvantage8. The 
Clinton Administration felt that such a move would almost certainly prompt the 
withdrawal of UN forces on the ground in Bosnia, which would then trigger an 
earlier US commitment to assist militarily in that withdrawal (Bass, 1998:99-100).  
 The US decided to lead a new negotiating effort, whose main goal would 
be a unified Bosnia. Although the talks at the US air force base in Dayton, Ohio, 
were planned to be of the proximity kind, on the very first day direct meetings 
between parties began to take place. The remaining twenty days of negotiations 
included a combination of direct and proximity, formal and informal talks between 
the Balkan leaders themselves, and often, but not always, with the US and 
European negotiators. The success at Dayton hinged on territory and after 21 days 
of talks and some last minute drama worthy of a Hollywood film, a deal was 
reached. 
 The Dayton Peace Accords consisted of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and eleven annexes setting forth 
                                                
6 From 1990 until the outbreak of wars in Croatia and Bosnia in March 1992, the US administration’s 
strategy was to forestall the collapse of the Yugoslav federation, but once violence erupted, the policy 
shifted from prevention to containment (Western, 1999:118-119).  
7 Named after the UN Bosnia representative Cyrus Vance and his EU counterpart David Owen. 
8 At the beginning of the conflict, the UN imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. The embargo did 
not have any significant effect on Bosnian Serbs, who got their supplies from Serbia, which had a large 
domestic industry and plentiful stocks.  
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obligations by the parties and the international community to implement the 
agreement9. The essence of the Accords included the provisions that: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will continue to exist as a single state within its current, internationally 
recognized boundaries; it will consist of two entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation 
and Republika Srpska, which respectively occupy 51 and 49 percent of Bosnia; the 
central government will be composed of a popularly elected three-member 
presidency and parliamentary assembly, which will reflect the multiethnic character 
of Bosnia and guarantee minority rights. 
 While it was praised for bringing peace to Bosnia after three years of war, 
The Dayton Peace Agreement very quickly attracted criticism too. The most serious 
criticism was that it was simply a successful cease-fire agreement, whose political 
provisions - giving refugees the right of return and affirming a single country and a 
central government - could never be implemented. The Dayton indeed brought 
peace to Bosnia, but the Bosnia created at Dayton is still far from a stable and 
prosperous democracy, able to stand on its own feet, without international 
supervision. The ethnic divisions still remain and continue to pose a threat to 
Bosnia's stability. The Dayton Agreement did not result from a decisive military 
victory by one of the warring parties on the ground, nor was it a consequence of a 
mutually hurting stalemate, where exhaustion among all the main parties and the 
impossibility of major military breakthroughs created strong incentives for a 
negotiated compromise to emerge. Rather, the Dayton represents a typical case of 
"enhanced consent" – a peace agreement hammered out and ultimately signed under 
heavy international pressure (Recchia, 2007:3). The price to be paid for reaching an 
agreement at Dayton was essentially twofold: first, the Agreement de facto ratified 
the results of ethnic cleansing on the ground; second, it explicitly legitimated the 
interests of neighbouring states in the Bosnian internal order (Recchia, 2007:3).  
 The Clinton administration’s Bosnian experience confirmed a key lesson 
about the relationship between force and diplomacy. It showed that the threat of 
force, especially of air power, was a useful tool for achieving diplomatic ends. This 
experience would profoundly influence Washington's thinking during the Kosovo 
crisis. The use of force would, however, influence the thinking of the local actors 
too. The Dayton demonstrated that might, rather than reason, brought rewards; and 
it showed that the carving out of ethnically pure territorial units produced neater 
maps on which to build a peace settlement (Silber and Little, 1996:382). Three 
years later, these two points would not be lost on Milosevic and the Kosovo 
Albanians. 
                                                
9 For the complete text of the agreement, see Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) 
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4.- Rambouillet peace Talks. 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration forced the question of self-determination of all 
Yugoslav nations on to the international agenda. While the Badinter Commission10 
recognized the right of the Yugoslav republics to seek independence, the same right 
was not given to Kosovo 11 . Instead, the governments and international 
organizations involved in responding to this claim insisted that its human rights 
should be respected and meaningful self-administration restored in Kosovo (Weller, 
1999:215). By that time, Milosevic had abolished the significant autonomy that 
Kosovo had enjoyed under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution12. The ending of the war 
in Bosnia brought no end to the crisis in Kosovo. On the contrary, the Dayton Peace 
Agreement completely bypassed the conflict in Kosovo and left the Albanians 
exactly where they were before. However, the Dayton made it clear to the Kosovo 
Albanians that violent nationalism is recognized (Buckwalter, 2002:97; D’Amico, 
2006:274; Petritsch and Pichler, 2002:73-4; Sterling-Folker, 2006:337). Kosovo’s 
Albanians increasingly gravitated towards armed struggle (Caplan, 1998:752). 
Hence, new political actors entered the stage demanding more decisive steps and 
more solid means towards the realization of their goals. The most significant of 
these was a guerrilla force that called itself The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)13. 
The KLA started attacking Serbian security forces in the province 14 . Often 
indiscriminate in their attacks, the rebels seemed intent on provoking a massive 
Serb response so that international intervention would be unavoidable. Serbian 
                                                
10 In September 1991, three months after the war began following Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations 
of independence, the EC established an arbitration commission, known as the Badinter Commission after 
its chief jurist, Robert Badinter, president of the French Constitutional Court. The commission was 
expected to help resolve differences which might arise in the context of peace negotiations among the 
Yugoslav parties that were soon to begin in The Hague, but it also issued a number of important opinions 
concerning the legal status of Yugoslavia and its constituent units.  
11 Under theYugoslav Constitution, the people of Yugoslavia were either "nations" or "nationalities". 
The nations - Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and from 1971 Bosnian Muslims - 
were entitled to their own republic. By contrast, ‘nationalities’ were peoples who were, in effect, cut off 
from an existing motherland. The most important of the ‘nationalities’ were the Kosovo Albanians and 
the Hungarians who lived in Vojvodina in the north. Under the constitution the nations theoretically 
possessed the right to secede. Kosovo was not a republic, and according to Judah (2000:37), under no 
circumstances could the Kosovo Albanians ever be allowed to become a republic lest one day they 
should try to exercise the right to secede. This distinction suited the EC and ultimately the international 
community well, for it allowed a line to be drawn between entities whose independence would be 
legitimately recognized and those whose independence would not (Caplan, 1998:748).  
12 Until 1989, together with the province of Vojvodina, Kosovo enjoyed virtually all the prerogatives of a 
republic, including its own constitution, government, courts and national bank, and an equal voice within 
the collective federal presidency.   
13 Ushtria Çlirimitare e Kosovës (UCK) in Albanian. 
14 The first significant armed clash between Albanians and Serb forces took place towards the end of 
1997 (Malcolm, 2002:xxxviii). 
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security forces usually responded in a disproportionate manner, indiscriminately 
attacking whole villages, killing civilians, and creating a growing refugee crisis, 
thus playing into the hands of the KLA15. Serbs too were being kidnapped and 
murdered, but Milosevic was unable to turn this into diplomatic advantage. 
Violence achieved in just a few months what peaceful resistance and countless 
diplomatic consultations could not for years. This new situation forced the 
international community to take firmer steps in Kosovo.  
 As the crisis worsened over the summer of 1998, the United States, acting 
with the involvement and support of the Contact Group, commenced a process of 
indirect negotiations through shuttle diplomacy between the government of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the political leaders of the Kosovo Albanians16. 
The shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade and Pristina led by Chris Hill, US 
Ambassador to Macedonia at the time, culminated in the talks at Rambouillet, 
France, to try to achieve a negotiated solution that would provide for a cease-fire, 
an interim peace settlement with a system of self-government for Kosovo, and the 
deployment of an international force within Kosovo to uphold that settlement. 
According to Zartman (2005:253-4), the Kosovo process had two crossing tracks: 
the diplomatic track was a previous formula for autonomy which changed only in 
details, and the military track were the competing efforts of the Yugoslav 
government and the KLA - the Serbs aiming to achieve military extermination of 
the KLA, and the KLA aiming to bring about an international military involvement 
until independence would be granted. Until the two competing efforts at elimination 
had firmly checked each other, both on the ground and in the two parties’ minds, 
the parties would not engage on the first track toward an agreed outcome. Thus, the 
challenge to the mediators was not merely to devise a formula agreeable to both 
sides, since the bargaining zones of the two simply did not overlap, but to convince 
both parties that they had no alternatives and that their competing efforts to 
eliminate each other in Kosovo would not work (Zartman, 2005:253-4). The 
political bargain offered to the two sides at Rambouillet was this: if the Kosovo 
Albanians agreed to the Contact Group's plan, they would get the international 
                                                
15 In late summer 1998, some 200,000 people were displaced within Kosovo (Judah, 2000:177). 
16 A little later, when according to the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (2003: 491), it 
became obvious that no political settlement would be possible without the rebels, US diplomats began 
meeting with KLA representatives too. This was a big change from the previous US position, when the 
KLA was considered a terrorist group (see Judah, 2000:138).  
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protectorate for the length of the interim period of three years; otherwise, they 
would be abandoned; if Serbia did not agree, NATO would bomb it17. 
 The idea was that Rambouillet would host proximity talks in which the 
negotiators would shuttle between the delegations. A list of non-negotiable 
principles, prepared by the Contact Group, formed the framework of an Interim 
Agreement to which the parties were supposed to agree. The principles included the 
preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the rump Yugoslavia 
(FRY consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) and high degree of self-governance for 
Kosovo, including a President and Government (Petritsch and Pichler, 2002:143-
144). The implementation of the Agreement was to be guaranteed by a strong 
NATO presence on the ground. The parties were invited to submit comments and 
amendments to the political settlement. 
 Kosovo Albanians immediately objected that the text did not include a 
clause on the referendum, which would decide whether the province should become 
independent (Petritsch and Pichler, 2002:157). They would insist on this until the 
very end of the talks. The Serbian delegation made opening comments and then fell 
more or less silent for the next ten days. The Serb move appeared predicated on the 
assumption that the Albanians would ultimately reject the document and hence 
shoulder the blame for the collapse of the conference (Petritsch and Pichler, 
2002:158). The reason for this was that they were informed by the Russians that in 
the Contact Group meetings before Rambouillet it had been agreed that the word 
"referendum" could not appear in the final text. This was because everyone 
understood that in the event of a referendum the Kosovo Albanians would always 
win, thanks to their overwhelming numerical superiority in the province (Judah, 
2000:206-7).  
 In the end, the Serbian side was ready to seriously negotiate the civilian 
aspect of the agreement (Petritsch and Pichler, 2002:170). At the same time, it 
adamantly refused to discuss the possibility of a NATO-led Implementation Force. 
The problem for the Serbs was the Military Annex18. It had the wording of a 
standard Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that NATO signs with any state 
hosting its troops, and, according to the then NATO Supreme Commander, General 
Wesley Clark (cited in Hendriksen, 2007:170), it was modelled on the military 
                                                
17 At the same time, German EU Presidency devised a carrot that was offered to the Serbian side. It 
included phased abolition of all sanctions against FRY within two years (Petritsch and Pichler, 
2002:172).  
18 While this term has been adopted and widely used, in the actual text of the proposed Rambouillet 
Agreement this is called Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force 
(Rambouillet Agreement, 1999).  
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annex used at Dayton19. The Serb authorities claimed that this was tantamount to an 
attempt to occupy the whole of Serbia, and it was one of the major reasons why 
they rejected the whole package at Rambouillet (Judah, 2000:210). Equally 
unacceptable to the Serb side was a clause added at the insistence of the Kosovo 
Albanian delegation, which stipulated that after three years the final status of 
Kosovo would be determined, inter alia, by "the will of the people" (Hosmer, 
2001:14)20. After further wrangling, the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the 
agreement on March 18, while the Serbs refused to do so. The NATO bombing of 
Serbia started four days later.  
 Why did, then, the Serbs refuse to sign the Rambouillet Agreement? They 
cited the Military Annex as the main reason for not signing, claiming that it 
amounted to occupation of a sovereign country. However, it is more likely that 
Milosevic had decided that his political survival was less at risk if he rejected the 
Agreement and saw through what he believed was going to be a short bombing 
campaign (Kovačević, 2007:253). After all, Kosovo was much more central to his 
political power base and Serb nationalism than Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb 
Republic had been (Owen, 2001:69)21.  
 The main problem with Rambouillet was that the text offered to the parties 
did not provide clear clues about the more deep-seated principle - self-
determination or territorial integrity 22 . The draft agreement discussed at 
                                                
19The disputed text read: "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and 
equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including 
associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, 
manoeuvre, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training and 
operations". (Rambouillet Agreement, 1999) 
20  By now, according to one American official (in Hendriksen, 2007:171), "the price of saving 
Rambouillet was to tie ourselves more and more closely to the Albanians".  
21 Hosmer (2001:8-10) lists four reasons why Milosevic wanted to maintain Serb control and dominance 
over Kosovo: First, the vast majority of Serbs had a strong attachment to Kosovo, which they consider 
"the cradle of Serbia’s identity and the mainspring of its ancient culture; Second, Milosevic’s own 
political persona was closely associated with the Serb ascendancy in Kosovo - he clearly owed his initial 
rise to power in the Serbian communist party and Yugoslavia to his exploitation of Serbian nationalist 
sentiments and the promotion of Serbian hegemony in Kosovo; Third, Kosovo, from the early 1990s 
onward, had provided Milosevic’s ruling Socialist Party with sufficient additional seats in the Serbian 
parliament to give it a near parliamentary majority; Fourth, Milosevic had continued to rely on Kosovo 
as a means to bolster his sagging political position within Serbia, exploiting the Kosovo issue to raise 
nationalist passions, mobilize public support, and distract people from the other serious problems facing 
Serbia".  
22 Madeleine Albright (2003:490) says that the US reluctance to endorse independence was shaped less 
by principle than by a pragmatic assessment of attitudes in the region: Macedonia and Greece strongly 
opposed independence for Kosovo because they feared it might inflame separatist ambitions within their 
own ethnic Albanian populations; other countries also had minorities with aspirations for independence; 
and more generally, some Europeans feared that an independent Kosovo would become a hotbed of 
Islamic extremism and organized crime.  
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Rambouillet committed to territorial integrity of the FRY and made numerous 
references to the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act, two documents that affirm the 
sovereignty as a central norm in the international system. At the same time, it left 
the question of the final status of Kosovo unresolved and provided for a three-year 
interim period, after which the issue would be revisited to reflect the will of the 
people23. As to the method of this expression of the will, the document was 
ambiguous. This created a kind of a prisoner's dilemma, which left no space for a 
mutually acceptable solution. It appears that the main strategy of the Serbs in 
Rambouillet was based on the assumption that the Albanians would reject an 
agreement because it would not offer them the independence they sought 
(Hendriksen, 2007:170). This would leave Milosevic with a free hand to finish the 
KLA off militarily. At the same time, realizing they could not get independence 
right away, the Kosovo Albanians accepted the agreement in the hope that the 
Serbian rejection of it would bring about NATO intervention. After two and a half 
months of that intervention, Milosevic finally accepted a deal which on the military 
side involved a full withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo and thus amounted to 
capitulation, but on the political side referred to Yugoslavia’s "sovereignty and 
territorial integrity" and "a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future 
status". By then, one of the main proclaimed objectives of the diplomatic process - 
to stop the violation of human rights and reverse a humanitarian crisis - had been 
blown to pieces. 
 
5.- A comparative look at the Dayton and Rambouillet talks. 
 
As stated earlier, the Dayton was a success in two crucial aspects: it brought peace 
to Bosnia after three years of war, and it preserved the country as a single entity, 
which had indeed been the main goal of the negotiations. Along the same lines, 
Rambouillet was a failure because it did not bring about peace, but instead ended in 
a massive escalation of the conflict in Kosovo, which saw a NATO intervention 
against a sovereign European country. Still, regardless of their different outcomes, 
the two conflicts and sets of peace negotiations have a lot in common. They involve 
the same region, similar causes, and some of the same actors and strategies. Also, 
the two case studies offer similar lessons for further research of intra-state conflicts, 
third party mediation and the applicability of competing theories of international 
relations in interpreting conflicts.  
                                                
23 Albright (2003:511) says the proposal developed at Rambouillet ‘required the Kosovars to delay, but 
not abandon, their aspirations for independence’. 
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 Both case studies included intensive Pre-negotiation stages - Bosnia with 
the Holbrooke shuttle, and Kosovo with the Hill process. Although very difficult, 
this stage in the Bosnian process ended successfully and led to the continuation of 
the talks in the Formula stage. That stage was also run by the Holbrooke team, 
which then managed to successfully prepare and run the Details stage as well (for 
stages of negotiation see Zartman and Berman in Berridge, 2005:29-52). On the 
other hand, the Hill process in Kosovo was practically dead by the end of 1998, and 
the subsequent talks in Rambouillet came about as a consequence of the changing 
situation on the ground. The talks were not actually planned during the Hill shuttle. 
Prior to Rambouillet, the Formula stage was decided by the Contact Group and 
presented to the parties as a fait accompli. It included detailed arrangements for the 
envisaged interim agreement for Kosovo - using the Hill process as a starting point 
and as such, it did not provide for a meaningful Details stage the parties would 
negotiate at Rambouillet. Rather, Rambouillet was an exercise in getting the parties 
to agree on a formula drafted and decided without their direct involvement.   
 In both Bosnia and in Kosovo, the parties accepted a mediator that was 
external to the conflict, and whose mediation was of the active type. They accepted 
the United States as the leading mediator, not because of its impartiality, but 
because of its ability to influence each party and the need to secure guarantees of 
any settlement from the mediator24.    
 To be effective, mediation must take place at the right moment. What are 
the circumstances that make intra-state conflicts ripe for resolution? According to 
Ohlson (2008:146), the perception of ripeness most often results from power 
politics, force, coercion and fear. The change in behaviour is enforced, not 
voluntary, and it does not normally come from political goodwill, moral 
reassessment or a genuine change of mind. Instead, it emerges out of power-based 
pressures inherent in the conflict process itself. Ripeness and war termination are, 
most often, caused by resource constraints and reduced opportunities to 
successfully prosecute the war. It often has little to do with changed attitudes or 
rectified grievances (Ohlson, 2008:146). Here lies the crucial difference between 
Dayton and Rambouillet (Kovačević, 2004:308; Daalder and O'Hanlon in 
Hendriksen, 2007:173). In the run-up to Dayton, the war in Bosnia was almost 
coming to an end, and all three warring parties were exhausted and most likely 
without chances to realize their ambitions by military means. The ripening process 
was "manufactured or engineered by the coercing power" (Burg, 2004:253) and the 
                                                
24 Although at Rambouillet the Contact Group formally had the leading role in the negotiations, the 
parties, particularly the Kosovo Albanians, expected the US to influence the process and provide 
guarantees in case of an agreement. The Serbian side looked to the Russians for support.   
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mediation came at a late stage in the conflict. In Kosovo, in the run-up to 
Rambouillet, the war was, in a way, just beginning; the Serbs were preparing for a 
final showdown with the Albanian rebels, who, on their part, did not comply with a 
previous ceasefire agreement and continued with the attacks hoping to provoke 
disproportional response by the Serb security forces and thus bring NATO ever 
closer to intervening. Here, the mediation came somewhere between early (before 
the rise of the KLA) and late stages (after a prolonged military conflict and a 
stalemate), which also helps explain why it was not successful. Furthermore, 
Milosevic had much to gain from a negotiated solution to the Bosnian War, because 
indirectly it threatened his domestic power base in Serbia, where the UN economic 
embargo was affecting the everyday life of the average Serb (Hendriksen, 
2007:182). This was not the case in Kosovo, because at that time most of the 
economic sanctions against Serbia had been lifted. Even more importantly, the 
stakes were not the same, at least not for Milosevic; Kosovo represented his ascent 
to power and a very significant part of Serb history and culture - much greater than 
in Bosnia and thus harder to give up (Hendriksen, 2007:173; Hosmer, 2001:18).   
 In such circumstances, what was the best strategy for the mediators? In 
both case studies, the mediator opted for directive strategy, affecting the content 
and substance, as well as the process of mediation. To achieve this, a mediator 
usually has two principal tools at its disposal: leverage and problem-solving 
abilities (Stedman in Ohlson, 2008:147). Leverage mainly refers to the ability of the 
mediator to alter the objective environment of the conflict and the parties, by 
influencing their war fighting capacity or by offering security guarantees to 
minimize the fears of peace. Problem-solving refers to the ability to devise 
solutions that to a sufficient degree deal with grievances and meet the concerns, 
demands and goals of the parties. The role of mediators is to make belligerents 
perceive of a given situation as conducive to a negotiated solution (Ohlson, 
2008:147). With regard to leverage, Kissinger (1994:488) argues that it is the 
pressure on the battlefield that generates the negotiation, and this is exactly what we 
saw in Bosnia. In Kosovo, the coercing party exercised no known leverage over the 
KLA and rapidly declining leverage over the Kosovo Albanian political leadership 
and Milosevic (Burg, 2004:264-5)25. The lack of pressure on the battlefield was a 
                                                
25 As far as the rebels were concerned, the mediators did not have much of a leverage over them anyway, 
since the threat of abandoning them was not very clear, and certainly not something they worried about 
much. As German General Klaus Naumann said after the war, "I think we had a chance to prevent war in 
the fall of 1998. Milosevic honoured the October Agreement, but the KLA exploited the withdrawal of 
FRY forces and took some provocative steps. They started the conflict then, but NATO had no 
instrument to influence them. In fact, the failure by NATO to influence the KLA at that time was the 
biggest deficiency of the diplomatic effort." (in Hendriksen 2007: 185) 
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major impediment to successful negotiations. There existed only a threat of force by 
NATO, which Milosevic did not believe was credible. He felt sufficiently strong to 
try and crush the KLA. 
 In both case studies coercive diplomacy played an important part; the 
crucial difference was that in Bosnia, diplomacy was preceded by the actual use of 
force, whereas in Kosovo the use of force came only after diplomacy failed. The 
essence of successful deterrence or coercion is the credibility of your threat, which 
requires a firm and clear communication of your resolve and also fine calculation of 
the potential effectiveness of your threat on your opponent’s beliefs (Matthews, 
1993:109). In Bosnia, the threat was followed by the actual use of force, and that 
provided a much firmer basis for conducting diplomacy than would have been the 
case if force had not been used (Daalder, 2000:185). In the case of Kosovo, the 
threat of air strikes by NATO lacked credibility in the eyes of Milosevic. This was 
mostly caused by the lack of follow-through on earlier threats of military action 
over the crisis in the province (Daalder, 2000:185-6)26. A further complication with 
coercive diplomacy is that the threat of external intervention changes the balance of 
power in favour of the group that is being abused, which in a situation of civil war, 
makes the potential victims cocky about their prospects in a continued armed 
struggle (Snyder, 2008:11). We saw this in Bosnia, both before and at Dayton, 
where the Muslim side, buoyed by recent military successes and after the NATO 
strikes, thought the Serbs could be completely defeated. This to a great extent 
explains its inflexibility at Dayton. Similar problem was present in Kosovo, where 
the KLA did not have strong incentives to negotiate, but rather to keep on 
provoking the Serb retaliation and thus bring NATO intervention closer.  
 There were important differences between the problem solving capabilities 
of the mediators in Bosnia and Kosovo, too. At Dayton it was possible to devise a 
platform acceptable to all three sides; the deal was a compromise that was easier for 
the three sides to sell to their constituents than the one offered at Rambouillet. In 
both case studies the parties were trying to maximize their security and, under the 
security dilemma, they were looking for relative gains. The crucial difference is that 
in Bosnia, the American mediators managed to turn the situation into a non-zero-
sum one and steer the parties towards a search for an absolute gain. Bosnia was 
preserved as a single country (which was the goal of the Muslim side), but was in 
effect partitioned (which was the Serb goal). The Croats played along since they 
had already got back previously occupied parts of Croatia. At Rambouillet, 
however, the mediators had a more difficult job of making belligerents perceive of 
                                                
26 The Clinton administration first employed the threat of air strikes in the early autumn of 1998. 
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a given situation as conducive to a negotiated solution - they did not manage to 
persuade the parties to seek absolute and not relative gains. There were several 
reasons for that: the two sides had diametrically opposing positions, with the 
Kosovo Albanians insisting on independence, and the Serb side not willing to 
accept even substantial autonomy for Kosovo; the sticks were not seen by the 
parties as credible enough, and the carrots were not seen as attractive enough. 
Finally, the mediating team had reduced leverage since it was not as united as at 
Dayton, with the Russian member of the mediating team at Rambouillet refusing to 
discuss the military part of the agreement.  
 I now turn to the question of why various international actors decided to 
get involved in the Yugoslav crisis. The change from bipolarity to unipolarity at the 
end of the Cold War not only saw an increasing number of intrastate conflicts, but 
also allowed for a change in the strategic thinking of the United States and other 
major Western powers. Calls for democracy and respect of human rights became 
more prominent, and the previously untouchable notion of state sovereignty started 
to become challenged27. As Snyder (2008:8) points out, it is not accidental that 
humanitarian interventions have been on the rise since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, partly because of a proclaimed change in norms, and partly because the 
costs and risks of interventions seemed more calculable and controllable. The shift 
in the strategic thinking after the Cold War was mutually reinforced by the changed 
rhetoric, which emphasized morality, human rights and challenges to sovereignty. 
The outbreak of violent ethnic conflict in the Balkans, supported by a high level of 
media exposure, challenged the more reactive and territorial defence-oriented 
national security cultures and initiated a process of societal learning in a number of 
states towards a more active role in security and defence (Heiselberg in Meyer, 
2005:540). The mobilization of public opinion through the news media was also a 
major factor which prompted political leaders in the West to actively get involved 
in the Balkans, despite the lack of obvious national interests. There was an 
understanding that the best way to deal with the Yugoslav crises was through 
institutions - the established ones, such as the UN, NATO and OSCE, or ad-hoc 
ones, such as the Contact Group. In line with the neoliberal theory, these 
institutions helped major powers involved in the Yugoslav conflicts – the US, EU 
and Russia - better identify security challenges, overcome various obstacles to 
cooperation, and therefore produce efficiency gains in security management. It is 
true that in dealing with the crises in the Balkans, there was, to an extent, rivalry 
between institutions. This was especially the case in Kosovo, where the UN was to 
                                                
27 For examples see Blair (1999) and Annan (1999). 
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a large extent bypassed in favour of NATO, (and, to a lesser extent, the Contact 
Group), but this does not undermine the fact that institutions played a major role in 
the search for solution in the Balkans.  
 At the same time, the Western powers that got involved in the Yugoslav 
crisis largely ignored some other conflicts raging around the world. Even in 
Yugoslavia, principles and norms alone were not enough to get NATO members to 
go to war – as the 1992-1995 period in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated (Kay, 
2005:20). Great powers rarely adhere to norms which are not ultimately compatible 
with their interests (Desch, 2003:418-419). At the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis 
the EU wanted to establish itself as a major international player and it only called 
on the United States to get involved when it realized that it would not be able to 
solve the problem on its own. The United States remained on the sidelines of the 
Bosnian conflict until the Clinton administration concluded that a continuation of 
the war would further undermine the credibility of the US position as the European 
security guarantor (Taliaferro, 2006:44)28. This was even more pronounced in 
Kosovo, where it was the combination of the previous Bosnian experience and the 
risk to NATO’s credibility that energized the Western leaders into diplomatic action 
and, ultimately, war. In both conflicts, Russia too had a strong interest because it 
wanted to preserve its declining power and influence, especially in a region it 
considered strategically important, and it feared that NATO involvement would 
threaten its security. 
 
6.- Conclusion. 
 
The search for a solution to the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo has demonstrated 
two things: that liberal states, who have been successful in creating a zone of peace 
amongst themselves, have difficulties when dealing with a non-liberal world, and; 
that the academic separation of liberalism and realism matters little to the 
policymakers when they have to make stark moral choices between a just peace and 
a quick end to hostilities, or between democracy and efficiency. Hyland (in 
Hendriksen, 2007:76) notes that the end of the Cold War allowed the United States 
to shift focus 'from primarily an interest-based foreign policy to one that rested 
more on such values as democracy, market economics, humanitarian relief, and 
genocide suppression'. While the dominant rhetoric has shifted towards idealism, 
the actual practice has retained a degree of caution and pragmatism (Dobson, 
2002:591-2). The main architect of the Dayton Agreement, Richard Holbrooke 
                                                
28 For an overview of systemic imperatives and the overall goals of US grand strategy after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, see Taliaferro 2006, p.42-43. 
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(1999:370), argues that the choice between realists and idealists was a false one, 
and that in the long run the US strategic interests and human rights supported and 
reinforced each other, and could be advanced at the same time. Bosnia and Kosovo 
illustrate the difficulties policymakers of the leading world powers face when their 
responsibility to defend international law and protect human rights around the 
world is posited against the wider strategic concerns, as well as against the 
responsibility to safeguard their own country and its citizens. The Yugoslav conflict 
presented liberal Western states with a difficult riddle of finding the right balance 
between support for self-determination and sovereignty. In trying to solve this 
riddle, they chose the middle way of alternating between realist and liberal policies, 
leaving behind imperfect solutions which have impeded development in the region 
ever since.   
 Yugoslav conflicts also showed that in the post-communist world, the fall 
of authoritarian states could easily lead to secession and ethnic conflict. The 
management of the dissolution of Yugoslavia reflected a far broader process of 
change in the international system and pointed to three important developments: a 
fundamental change in the roles of international actors; a struggle about core values 
of the international system; and the legitimacy of the threat or use of force in 
international relations (Weller, 1999:211-12). Yugoslav conflicts hardly posed a 
threat to the US national interest, although the growing refugee crisis and the 
possible spill-over of the conflict did pose a security threat to the European 
countries. In the end, Western governments could not ignore the persistence of 
conflict and massive human rights violations. Bosnia and Kosovo certainly served 
to reinforce the relevance of  NATO to solving security problems in Europe, and to 
demonstrate that Europe after the Cold War remained every bit as dependent on the 
USA for its security as it had been before (Cox, 2006:150; Headley, 2003:227; 
Snyder, 2008:6). However, I would argue that those were secondary reasons for the 
West’s involvement in the crisis. So, what explains the behaviour of the Western 
powers in the absence of either pressing risks to their national security or 
institutional commitments?  
 When the cause of a civil conflict, or of the failure of a state, is ethnic or 
religious strife, deep divisions exist between those who believe that the right to self-
determination must lead to borders based on ethnic or religious demarcation lines, 
and those who think that formulas of 'consociationalism' or federalism might save 
multicultural or multi-ethnic societies (Hoffmann 1995:47). These divisions were 
present at both Dayton and Rambouillet. The Dayton Agreement preserved the 
nominal unity of Bosnia, but, to paraphrase Bass (1998:106), it masked the shaky 
realist balancing act between Republika Srpska and the Croat-Muslim Federation. 
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Rambouillet failed because it came too late to offer the right balance between 
sovereignty and self-determination. Realists would argue that instead of holding 
together multi-ethnic states, it would have served the interests of human rights and 
long-term stability better to divide them up into ethnically homogenous areas. This, 
however, would have been against the core liberal principles of the post-Cold War 
Western world. The Yugoslav conflict was among those that presented liberal states 
with a difficult riddle: to intervene in order to protect individuals whose rights are 
being abused in non-liberal regimes, but to keep costs as low as possible so as not 
to antagonize domestic public, or to respect the sovereignty of the nation as the still 
dominant unit of the anarchic world we live in. In the end, they chose the middle 
way of alternating between realist and liberal policies, leaving behind imperfect 
solutions and problems that might reoccur in future.  
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